Por uma leitura ciceroniana de Sócrates, Platão e o ceticismo da “nova Academia”

Abstract

The present work aims to make a brief exposition of academic skepticism and the relation of the skeptical Academy to the Ciceronian interpretation of the Arcesislau’s dialectic as a revival of the Socratic and Platonic spirits in opposition to the admission of the stoic thesis of the apprehensibility (katalepsis) in his work Academics. More specifically, we will work on the Socratic realization of his own ignorance about the unknowable character of nature, and how the Socratic doubt radicalization by Arcesilau engenders the idea that in the face of contradictory and incompatible discourses about the same object, both being of equal persuasion, isostheneia is the reason why Arcesilau finds himself compelled to dispute with Zeno of Cithius in opposition to the Stoic criterion of apprehensive representation (phantasia kataleptike) in favor of the suspension of the judgment (epoche).