Contratações de serviço na Administração Pública Federal: explorando os fatores associados ao desempenho dos contratos no IFRJ

Abstract

The bidding process generates costs for the contractor since the public agents spend the time and efforts to carry out the procedures inherent to the stages that involve the contracting of services. These costs, called transaction costs, are present throughout the preparation, negotiation and safeguard of the agreement. In this sense, the theoretical basis used for this study was the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) which, in a nutshell, deals with how various institutional arrangements, particularly firm, market and contracts are organized to achieve efficiency gains resulting from the minimization of these costs. In addition, considering that public contracting involves the interests of multiple stakeholders, Stakeholder Theory also served as conceptual support. Thus, this descriptive and qualitative research has studied the effects of the behavioral and transactional factors discussed in the TCT in the relationships among the stakeholders involved in the planning and execution of the IFRJ service contracts that are tendered by electronic bidding, considering that the behaviors coming from interactions of these parts are potentially divergent. The research strategy involves bibliographic, documental and field research through semiestructured interviews with the stakeholders of the researched institution like requesters, auctioneer, shopping team, representative of the company, managers and public contracts inspectors. The interviews aimed to capture the influence and risks associated with the action of these factors on the performance of hiring. Subsequently, through content analysis, inferences were produced about the collected materials. As a result, it was observed that factors such as limited rationality, opportunism, uncertainty, frequency and specificity of the assets present to a greater or lesser degree in the IFRJ hiring process have a direct impact on performance in terms of celerity, cost, conformity and quality. These results suggest to the studied organization the adoption of performance indicators for the monitoring of service hiring, besides the establishment of strategies to reduce information asymmetry, such as the practice of joint training and auctioneers by area. In short, it is recommended to adopt strategies that seek the management and monitoring of these hires so that the institution is less exposed to the actions of these factors in contract performance. Another relevant result of this research is the need to evaluate the impact on the performance of service contracts of the current criteria of impractible prices in the wining proposals in electronic bidding, as well as the adoption of parameters in the qualification phase of suppliers that involve the company's managerial capacity to perform the service.